Suchergebnisse

Labelling the 'other' is one of the most relevant aspects in an armed conflict context. Summarising what the opponent is in one single expression is a strong rhetorical tool in any belligerent discourse. The use of the 'terrorist' label assumes a particularly powerful role in such a construction. Employing Ole Wæver's layered discursive structure, this article aims to study the discursive practices and political consequences associated with the use of such labels. The political implications of using the 'terrorist' label in regards to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkish politics will be analysed as an illustrative case study. The period under analysis extends from April 2007 to January 2008, corresponding to the escalation of a security discourse that led to the (brief) Turkish military incursion in northern Iraq in the winter of 2007–2008. The political exposure and intense usage of the 'terrorist' label in this period makes it particularly ripe for understanding the political discursive context that shapes Turkey's policies towards this protracted conflict. The focus on this period also sheds light on the political reasons underlying the intractability of this conflict.

Many scholars and practitioners claim that labelling groups or individuals as "terrorists" does not simply describe them but also shapes public attitudes, due to the label's important normative and political charge. Yet is there such a "terrorist label effect"? In view of surprisingly scant evidence, the present paper evaluates whether or not the terrorist label – as well as the "Islamist" one – really impacts both the audience's perception of the security environment and its security policy preferences, and if yes, how and why. To do so, the article implements a randomized-controlled vignette experiment where participants (n=481) first read one out of three press articles, each depicting a street shooting in the exact same way but labelling the author of the violence with a different category ("terrorist"/"shooter"/"Islamist"). Participants were then asked to report on both their perceptions and their policy preferences. This design reveals very strong effects of both the "terrorist" and "Islamist" categories on each dimension. These effects are analysed through the lenses of social and cognitive psychology, in a way that interrogates the use of the terrorist category in society, the conflation of Islamism with terrorism, and the press and policymakers' lexical choices when reporting on political violence.

By considering the crisis labelling as a crucial dynamic enabling to securitize a political issue and to ensure a broad consensus on its processing, this contribution will focus on the impacts of the discourses and practices reacting to the terrorist and migratory "crises" on the European policy of external borders management. We will analyze how the process of crisis labelling by the national and European political personal occurs, and how it interacts with the daily activity of the bureaucrats and security professionals in charge of the negotiation and the monitoring of the European borders management policy. Then, we will demonstrate how this labelling is exploited by these bureaucrats and security professionals, even more as it is in line with a European borders management policy conceived only through a security prism, in which the discrete practices of the actors are much more efficient than the symbolic political measures reacting to "crises". This communication, which follows an approach close to the international political sociology, will draw on multiple interviews and a content analysis. ; En envisageant la labellisation en termes de crise comme étant une modalité cruciale permettant de sécuriser un enjeu politique et de s'assurer un consensus assez large sur son traitement, cette contribution s'intéressera aux effets des discours et des pratiques en réaction aux « crises » terroriste et migratoire sur la politique européenne de gestion des frontières extérieures. Nous verrons comment se déroule le processus de labellisation mené par les responsables politiques nationaux et européens et comment cela interagit avec l'activité quotidienne des bureaucrates et des professionnels de la sécurité chargés des négociations et du suivi de la politique européenne de gestion des frontières. Ensuite, nous montrerons que cette labellisation est en réalité exploitée par ces bureaucrates et professionnels de la sécurité, d'autant plus qu'elle s'inscrit dans une politique européenne de gestion des frontières conçue ...

The labelling career of the Lebanese armed group and political party Hizbullah is an interesting case with which to investigate the epistemological consequences of the politics of naming. Having found itself since its inception in the mid-1980s on the receiving end of mainly US and Israeli policy makers' and analysts' scorn for being an archetypical terrorist organisation, Hizbullah has been surprisingly successful in achieving its stated aims and in enduring the verbal and military onslaught against it. Although it is not the intention here to reduce explanations for Hizbullah's durability to discursive politics, this article suggests that both the labelling of Hizbullah as terrorist and, conversely, its identification as a "lebanonised" political force that is about to make its conversion into an unarmed political party are misleading and incapable of grasping this organisation's complexities. (InWent/GIGA)

One of the most contentious questions in international politics is the question of the definition of terrorism. Perhaps one of the better-known aphorisms is that "one man's terrorist is another man's liberation fighter."1 It is not accidental that this aphorism emerged within the context of the liberation struggles in Southern Africa in which the settlers/colonial oppressors described freedom fighters as terrorists and created the impression that the liberation armies were rebels without a just cause. A definition seems controversial for reasons other than conceptual issues and problems. Because labelling actions as terrorism promotes condemnation of the actors, a definition may reflect ideological or political bias

The fact that the terrorism has so many typologies highlights that the category known as 'terrorist criminality' is not based on an ontological considerations but on a labelling power's decision. It is necessary to avoid that criminal policy against terro ; La diversidad de tipologías que presenta el terrorismo pone de relieve que la categoría "criminalidad terrorista" no responde a consideraciones ontológicas, sino a la decisión de quien, en cada caso, tiene el poder de etiquetar. Para evitar que la polític

This study explores community perceptions of reintegration of returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from Al-Shabaab in coastal Kenya. Drawing from fieldwork accounts collected in Kwale and Mombasa Counties, Kenya, this study nuances and problematizes communities' perception of reintegration. The study fits into a growing yet unsettled discourse of what works well in reintegration initiatives for returning foreign terrorist fighters. Governments worldwide are focusing on fighting Islamist terror groups like ISIS and Al-Shabaab in East Africa. But the need to also build other strategic counter-terrorism capabilities has developed, even more so in the rehabilitation and reintegration of returning foreign terrorist fighters. How host communities perceive this shift from a whole-of-government, hard approach, to a whole-of-community, soft approach, will determine how effective this strategy is in the global fight against terrorism. In Kenya, it is estimated that at least 1,000 returnees live in communities along the coastal areas of Kwale and Mombasa. There is a paucity of research focusing on the perceptions of those communities absorbing the returnees in Kenya. This study draws on 31 interviews with government officials, returnees, academic experts, civil society actors, and 104 questionnaire interviews with community members in Kwale and Mombasa. The study's findings show that while the family and the society at large may be longing to see their loved ones, there are competing dilemmas involved, including stigma and negative labelling. The study also found that there is a lack of structures to ensure proper involvement of host communities in the reintegration of returnees. As such, the process is marred by lack of trust and negative labelling, which affects positive reintegration. The study's findings are useful for counter-radicalization policy formulation and practical peacebuilding interventions at the community level.

By looking at the understandings beneath the conceptualizations of security, the definitions about the 'war on terrorism', and the social constructions of 'the other' both in Russia and the EU, the paper argues that the securitization of the 'war on terrorism' despite following shared concerns and fitting the same labelling, implies differentiated understandings, leading to the securitization of different objects. This mismatch in understanding has been translated into policies and practices and has led to increasing friction in the relation, not just driven by internalized procedures, but also fostered by the external context, in a co-constitutive manner. The paper understands that the clarification and implementation of joint counter-terrorist efforts demands concerted action, along with a streamlining of these approaches into concrete common actions.

TheAKP government has constructed an online surveillance regime (not to mention censorship) via various legal and technical means. This article analyzes the emergence and expansion of online surveillance within the context of the AKP's authoritarian practices that are interwoven with its nationalist and populist politics. It beginswith an overview of legal and technical initiatives aimed at enhancing online surveillance, data collection and retention. It then focuses on the AKP's recent strategies designed to bolster this online surveillance regime such as the institutionalization ofonline "snitching" via a newly-introduced social media app that enables citizen-informants to "report terrorists" to the authorities. The article arguesthat the AKP's recent strategies and rationalities to regulate the conduct of online users are aligned with principles of "governing at a distance" and are informed by both its authoritarianism (exemplified by the repression of all forms of dissent in the broader media ecosystem) and its right-wing nationalism and populism (as seen in the stigmatizing of critical voices and/or certain groups as sources of threat, labelling them as "being against the nation" and as "terrorists").

Bibliography: leaves 129-135. ; The topic is "Steve Bantu Biko: Politician, 'Historian' and 'Proponent' of African Traditional Religion". It is known by everybody that Steve Bantu Biko was a politician. This has been revealed by his teachings, what his contemporaries have written and by his commitment to the course of the struggle. He displayed a commitment to the struggle for freedom of the oppressed blacks in South Africa. His ideology was 'Black Consciousness' which was a threat to the regime and an affirmation and a creation of true humanity for the oppressed. What became clear is the fact that there is a difference between a politician and a freedom fighter. To describe him as a freedom fighter is more appropriate than a politician. He was denied free political activity by the apartheid regime which clamped down on all opponents labelling them as 'un-Christian', 'heretic', 'rebels', 'agitators' and 'terrorists'. The 'Black Consciousness' ideology was viewed by the state as subversive. The question arises, how could a person who encouraged black community programmes and black unity be regarded as a terrorist? Fear from the whites of a black majority government is the cause for such an attitude. He was indeed a man of peace, an activist and not a terrorist. It has been noticeable that politics, history and religion are inseparable. This is a response to those who wonder what politics has to do with religion.

In recent months recurrent calls have been made by conservative right-wing politicians to designate Antifa a "domestic terrorist organization" in the United States. Fixated on the spectacle of its Black Bloc tactics they have equated Antifa, what is essentially an ad-hoc, non-hierarchical, geographically dispersed social movement comprised of local autonomous activist groups, with organized violent extremists. And yet, the evidence for such an equation has been mostly limited to a handful of instances that usually bare the hallmarks of political exaggeration or are alternatively attributable to individuals loosely associated with the Antifa movement. Why is this so? How do militant anti-fascists in the US understand violence and exercise restraint in their use of it? This article seeks an answer to these questions based on interviews with activists from Portland's Rose City Antifa, one of the United States' most well-known Antifa groups, and an analysis of a collection of the group's Tweets. It reveals that Antifa exercises considerable restraint, internally and externally, with regards to both the literal and rhetorical use of violence within its street and digital activism. In turn it calls upon others to exercise reciprocal levels of restraint by ceasing their labelling of Antifa as a "domestic terrorist" organization.

In recent months recurrent calls have been made by conservative right-wing politicians to designate Antifa a "domestic terrorist organization" in the United States. Fixated on the spectacle of its Black Bloc tactics they have equated Antifa, what is essentially an ad-hoc, non-hierarchical, geographically dispersed social movement comprised of local autonomous activist groups, with organized violent extremists. And yet, the evidence for such an equation has been mostly limited to a handful of instances that usually bare the hallmarks of political exaggeration or are alternatively attributable to individuals loosely associated with the Antifa movement. Why is this so? How do militant anti-fascists in the US understand violence and exercise restraint in their use of it? This article seeks an answer to these questions based on interviews with activists from Portland's Rose City Antifa, one of the United States' most well-known Antifa groups, and an analysis of a collection of the group's Tweets. It reveals that Antifa exercises considerable restraint, internally and externally, with regards to both the literal and rhetorical use of violence within its street and digital activism. In turn it calls upon others to exercise reciprocal levels of restraint by ceasing their labelling of Antifa as a "domestic terrorist" organization.

Cover -- Dedications -- Contents -- About the author -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1 Aviation safety and its impact on the global economy -- Aviation statistics 45; the crash effect and potential economic impact -- What constitutes aviation safety63; -- The pilot factor -- Is food safety a major aviation safety issue63; -- Aviation food safety and the global food chain link -- 2 Consumer perceptions 45; fact or fiction63; -- Airline catering overview -- The consumer view and how it drives the airline product -- Buy on board 45; the battle of the brands -- How safe is airline food63; -- Causative factors of food poisoning outbreaks associated with meals on aircraft -- Chain of events -- 3 Current codes of practice -- The International Health Regulations 40;IHR41; -- Comparison of roles of WTO44; WHO and CAC -- Impact of IHR on airlines8217; food safety policies -- IATA and ICAO guidelines -- Delivery and acceptance of catering supplies -- Meal and beverage service to the flight crew -- Food safety and hygiene 45; risks and prevention -- Crew personal hygiene -- Delayed flights -- Suspected food poisoning -- Special meals -- Galley and equipment hygiene -- Potable water and ice -- Insects -- Impact of non45;regulatory format of industry directives -- Food safety legislation -- Catering standards versus food manufacturing protocols -- Food labelling legislation -- Manufacturing45;style approaches to airline catering labelling -- Special45;meal labelling -- IFCA and IFSA World Food Safety Guidelines -- WHO guidelines -- Terrorist Threats To Food -- Guide To Hygiene and Sanitation in Aviation -- 4 Have Airlines Considered Crisis Prevention63; -- Management programmes required to facilitate HACCP implementation -- Education and training programmes essential to HACCP implementation -- People and process analysis -- Training requirements -- Developing a manufacturing45;based HACCP study -- Product and process evaluation -- Defining operational procedures to comply with the seven principles of HACCP -- Principle 158; Conduct a hazard analysis -- Principle 258; Determine the critical control points 40;CCPs41; -- Principle 358; Establish critical limits -- Principle 458; Establish a system to monitor control of the CCPs -- Principle 558; Establish corrective actions to be taken when monitoring indicates that a CCP is not under control -- Principle 658; Establish procedures for verification to confirm that the HACCP system is working effectively -- Principle 758; Establish appropriate documentation concerning all procedures and records appropriate to HACCP principles and their application -- Aviation catering HACCP versus manufacturing HACCP -- 5 Implementing manufacturing SOPs to achieve aviation food safety utopia -- Product development -- Product45;generic issues for consideration -- Product45;specific issues for consideration -- Development issues -- Supplier outsourcing -- Raw material procurement -- End product specifications -- Goods receipt -- Production protocols -- Assembly protocols -- Labelling and shelf45;life attribution -- Despatch protocols -- Verification microbiology and product recall -- In45;flight documentation -- 6 Liability issues 45; protecting the airline brand -- Aviation liability -- Establishment of the Warsaw Convention47;Montreal Conventi.